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ABSTRACT 
 This study examines the effect of expanded audit disclosures required by ISA 
700 (UK and Ireland), The Independent Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements, on 
the communication value of the audit report.  The new ISA 700 audit report is the first 
attempt by an auditing   standard-setter to include expanded auditor disclosure in the 
audit report.  The expanded disclosures significantly alter the pass/fail audit report 
model; however, it is not immediately clear that more audit report disclosures improve 
communication value. 
 I address whether communication value improves in the post-ISA 700 by hand-
collecting audit report content and demographic data from premium-listed London Stock 
Exchange and Irish Stock Exchange listed companies.  Using content analysis measures, 
readability and tone, as proxies for communication value, I find that in the post-ISA 700 
period: 1) audit report readability improves and 2) audit report tone changes with a 
higher occurrence of negative and uncertain words. I also evaluate analyst behavior in 
response to the ISA 700 audit report. I find that analyst following and analyst forecast 
dispersion decrease in the post-ISA 700 period. In additional analyses, I show that Big N 
and industry expert auditors write audit reports that are more readable.  I also find that 
domain-specific word dictionaries, generated from Form-10Ks and earnings press 
releases, have a lower frequency in audit reports in both the pre and post ISA 700 period.  
 With the heightened global interest in improving the historical pass/fail audit 
report, these results show that expanded audit disclosures can be communicated in a 
manner that is accessible and meaningful to the financial statement user.       
 iii 
 
 
DEDICATION 
To the fortitude of Sallie Clanton Thomas, the faith of Ruth Thomas Williams, 
and the future of Kanaan Hamilton Smith. 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 I thank my dissertation committee, Dechun Wang (Chair), Sarah Rice, Chris 
Wolfe, and Deidra Schleicher for their guidance and support throughout this research 
process. I am thankful for the support of my fellow Ph.D students at Texas A&M 
University and members of the PhD Project Accounting Doctoral Student Association 
during my matriculation.  I am especially grateful for the camaraderie and friendship of 
my fellow classmate, Erik Lewis Beardsley.    
  I appreciate the insights on the expanded audit report from senior audit 
practitioners in the United Kingdom that were integral to my research process.  I thank 
Colin Chapman for his assistance in collecting the UK annual reports used in this study.    
I gratefully acknowledge generous financial support from Texas A&M University, Mays 
Business School, AICPA Foundation, and KPMG Foundation.  
 I extend my deepest gratitude to the great “cloud of witnesses” that have 
provided their unyielding support of my academic endeavors.   I am grateful for the 
leadership of Dean Emeritus Quiester Craig and the accounting faculty at North Carolina 
A&T State University for providing the initial spark of intellectual curiosity that led me 
to pursue my doctorate in accounting.  I also appreciate the vision of Bernie Milano to 
increase the number of minority professors in business schools.   I will always treasure 
the advice and wisdom shared by countless mentors, counselors, and friends that kept me 
on the path to completion.  I will endeavor to pay these kindnesses forward to future 
accounting academics.  Finally, I am forever indebted to my family who shared in this 
journey with me.  To God be the glory for the marvelous things He has done.  
 v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Page 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... ii 
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................. iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... v 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ......................................... 8 
 
The Auditor’s Report on the Financial Statements (ISA 700) ................................... 8 
Audit Report Readability ............................................................................................ 9 
Audit Report Tone .................................................................................................... 12 
ISA 700 Audit Report and Analyst Behavior ........................................................... 14 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................... 18 
Content Measures ..................................................................................................... 18 
ISA 700 Implementation and Audit Report Readability (H1a) ................................ 20 
ISA 700 Implementation and Audit Report Tone (H1b) .......................................... 21 
ISA 700 and Analyst Following (H2a) ..................................................................... 22 
ISA 700 and Analyst Forecast Dispersion (H2b) ..................................................... 24 
Sample Selection ...................................................................................................... 25 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ............................................................................................ 27 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results ........................................................... 27 
Multivariate Results ................................................................................................. 29 
V. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES ................................................................................ 35 
ISA 700 Audit Report Readability and Audit Quality ............................................. 35 
ISA 700 Audit Report Readability and Audit Firms ................................................ 38 
Alternative Tone Measures Analysis ....................................................................... 40 
ISA 700 Implementation and Market Response ....................................................... 43 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 45 
 vi 
 
Page 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 47 
APPENDIX A .................................................................................................................. 54 
APPENDIX B .................................................................................................................. 56 
APPENDIX C .................................................................................................................. 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Communicating the results of financial statement audits has evolved from the 
two-paragraph report (AIA 1948; APC 1980) to the more recent multi-paragraph audit 
report (FRC 1993; AICPA 1988; PCAOB 2007). One mainstay in the evolution of the 
audit report is the standardized language that provides a uniform description of the audit 
process.1  To address the criticism on the opaque audit reports that are dominated by 
boilerplate language, the United Kingdom (UK) Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
issued International Standard on Auditing (UK and Ireland) 700, The Independent 
Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements (“ISA 700”) in June 2013 (FRC 2013a).  ISA 
700 requires audit reports, for issuers that comply with the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, to include a discussion of: 1) the risks of material misstatements with the greatest 
impact on engagement team effort; 2) the application of materiality in the audit; and 3) 
the scoping decisions made in the execution of the audit.  The standard suggests that in 
order for the audit report to be useful to investors, the additional disclosures should be 
client-specific and not general or standardized (FRC 2013a).2  The new ISA 700 audit 
report is the first attempt by a standard-setter to include expanded auditor disclosure in 
the audit report.  The expanded disclosures significantly alter the pass/fail audit report 
                                                 
1 In response to the Northern Rock bank failure, John Griffith-Jones, former UK KPMG Chief Executive Officer 
commented, “If you have a company that has leverage of 100 times and a company that has no leverage at all, the 
audit report is the same”(Osborne 2011).  This view highlights the challenge of the historical pass/fail model of the 
standard audit report which prompted standard-setters to consult with constituents to determine the best path forward 
to enhance the communication value of the standard audit report (FRC 2007; IAASB 2011; PCAOB 2010; PCAOB 
2013; PCAOB 2014; FRC 2013c).    
2 The UK Corporate Governance Code (“Code”), maintained by the FRC, provides principles and rules for boards of 
UK listed companies.  The Code is located here:  https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-
governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx . 
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model; however, it is not immediately clear that more audit report disclosures improve 
communication value.  Using the introduction of ISA 700 as a quasi-natural experiment, 
I examine whether the communication value of the audit report changes after the 
issuance of ISA 700.   
Communication value in financial reporting is evident when the information 
provided by the source is received by the destination (Smith and Smith 1971).  Coram, 
Mock, Turner, and Gray (2011) provide a similar definition when examining audit 
reports and note that communication value is shown when the message that is intended 
to be conveyed by the report is received by the intended user (Coram et al. 2011).  I use 
two content measures, readability and tone, as proxies for communication value.   
Readability is a communication measure that captures whether the receiver can 
understand the message delivered by the sender.  If the receiver understands the 
message, then the message is useful to the receiver thereby improving the 
communication value of the message.  Tone is a measure that captures the “affect or 
feeling of a communication” (Henry 2008).  If the audit report reflects the tone of the 
audit engagement, as expressed in the choice of words used in describing the audit, the 
receiver’s understanding is improved thereby enhancing communication value.  To 
assess the financial statement users’ response to ISA 700, I investigate the change in 
analyst behavior under the new reporting regime.  If the expanded audit report has 
increased in communication value, then analyst behavior should change, signaling an 
improvement in the information environment.    
 3 
 
 Evaluating the communication value of ISA 700 is important because it provides 
empirical evidence on whether the standard achieved its objective of enhancing 
communication between the auditor and the financial statement user.  As the UK is the 
first jurisdiction to require client-specific audit disclosure, assessing the communication 
value of the expanded audit report will benefit other standard-setters considering or 
adopting similar proposals (PCAOB 2013; PCAOB 2016; IAASB 2015).   Prior studies 
have shown the difficulty financial statement users have in understanding the 
information in audit reports (Church et al. 2008; Gray et al. 2011; Coram et al. 2011; 
Asare and Wright 2012; Manson and Zaman 2001; Hermanson et al. 1991). Academic 
research shows that the standard audit report did not convey financial risks during the 
financial crisis as the majority of the failed financial institutions received unqualified 
opinions prior to failing (Doogar et al. 2015; Sikka 2009).  The introduction of ISA 700 
provides a tailored approach for auditors to convey information that can enhance 
financial statement users’ understanding of the audit process.  The additional disclosures 
on risks of material misstatements, materiality, and audit scope give users insights into 
the auditor’s decision process during the audit.  Thus, consistent with the standard 
setters’ objective, I predict that the communication value of audit reports under ISA 700 
regime increases.      
 I address this important issue by examining audit report readability and audit 
report tone.   First, I adopt the method proposed by Smith and Smith (1971) and Li 
(2008) in evaluating the communication effectiveness of financial reports by measuring 
readability.  Readability measures have been used in evaluating disclosures and 
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accounting narratives (Beattie 2014; Li 2010; Jones and Shoemaker 1994), however 
there is limited research on audit report readability (Barnett and Loeffler 1979; Pound 
1981; Smith and Smith 1971). Previous studies on audit report readability performed in 
the late 1970’s are prior to the issuance of Statement of Auditing Standard No. 58, 
Reports on Audited Financial Statements (AICPA 1988) and the audit market 
consolidation of early 1990s.  I address this gap in the literature by comparing the 
readability of the newly introduced ISA 700 audit report to the pre-ISA 700 report using 
a sample of publicly traded firms from the UK and Ireland.   
 Second, I assess whether audit report tone changes in the post-ISA 700 period 
compared to the pre-ISA 700 period.  Accounting and finance literatures have introduced 
evaluating tone as an approach to further understand the impact of the written word on 
investor behavior (Antweiler and Frank 2004; Tetlock 2007; Tetlock et al. 2008; 
Loughran and McDonald 2011).  Historically, the audit report included legalistic and 
boilerplate language used in every audit report regardless of the underlying risks of the 
audit client.   With the ISA 700 report, the language used is auditor-generated which can 
give additional insights into the nature of the communication to the user.  I utilize 
financial word dictionaries developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011) to measure the 
tone of the expanded audit report. By comparing audit report tone in the pre-ISA 700 
and post-ISA 700 periods, I assess whether the auditor issues reports consistent with the 
FRC’s expectation to reduce general and boilerplate language.   
 Lastly, I investigate whether financial statement users respond to the expanded 
audit report.  Focusing on a subset of financial statement users, I test the association 
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between ISA 700 and two sell-side analyst behaviors:   analyst following and analyst 
forecast dispersion.  Assessing analyst following provides insight into analyst effort 
when the information environment changes. Evaluating analyst forecast dispersion 
determines whether the expanded audit report improves the information environment.   
When evaluating annual report readability, Lehavy, Li, and Merkley (2011) show that 
less readable Form 10-Ks are associated with greater analyst following and greater 
forecast dispersion (Lehavy et al. 2011).  However, it is an empirical question whether 
analysts respond similarly when the auditor is the source of the communication.    
 Using hand-collected audit report data from London and Irish Stock Exchange 
listed companies, I find that readability improves in the post-ISA 700 period. This 
finding supports that ISA 700 meets the objective of improving the value of the audit 
report to the financial statement user. I also find that the expanded audit report captures 
more client-specific audit risk with increases in negative and uncertain tone.   This 
finding rebuts criticisms that the new audit report includes boilerplate language that is 
not useful to the reader (IAASB 2011; Mock et al. 2013; Gray et al. 2011; Citi Research 
2014a). Finally, I find that analyst behavior changes in the post-ISA 700 period as 
evidenced by lower analyst following and lower analyst forecast dispersion.  In addition, 
less readable audit reports are associated with higher analyst following and higher 
analyst forecast dispersion in both the pre- and post-ISA 700 periods, consistent with 
Lehavy et al. (2011).  In supplemental analyses, I find that audit report readability and 
audit report tone are associated with high quality auditor characteristics.  I also find that 
domain-specific word dictionaries, generated from Form-10Ks and earnings press 
 6 
 
releases, have a lower frequency in audit reports in both the pre and post ISA 700 period 
suggesting that auditor disclosure is different from management disclosure.  
 My study makes several important contributions.  First, I add to the readability 
literature by expanding the readability of annual reports to audit reports.  Recent reviews 
on the auditor’s reporting model and archival audit research (Mock et al. 2013; DeFond 
and Zhang 2014) and initial studies on the US expanded audit report proposal 
(Christensen et al. 2014; Kachelmeier et al. 2014) illustrate the need for more research 
on standard-setting related to the audit report.     ISA 700 introduces several additional 
disclosures related to risk assessment, materiality, and audit scope designed to enhance 
the communication between the auditor and financial statement user.  Using this setting, 
my paper is the first to examine audit report readability in the current environment. My 
results show that these additional disclosures are useful when the disclosures effectively 
transmit the information that the auditor intended.    
 Second, I provide insight that is useful to standard-setters and regulators.   The 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) released guidance on 
expanded auditor reporting in January 2015 (IAASB 2015) and the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is currently deliberating expanding the audit 
report in the United States (PCAOB 2013; PCAOB 2016).  This study informs standard-
setters and regulators on how audit firms implemented ISA 700 in the United Kingdom 
and the response from financial statement users.   These findings could influence future 
standard-setting in this area.  I show that the audit report is more readable in the post-
ISA 700 period, which improves the communication value.  I also show that analysts 
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respond to the ISA 700 audit report, which confirms earlier analysts’ preferences for 
client-specific information in the report.     
 Finally, I expand the audit literature with the introduction of content measures to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the expanded audit report.  More specifically, unlike 
concurrent studies (Gutierrez et al. 2016; Lennox et al. 2015; Reid et al. 2015) that use a 
year dichotomous variable to compare the audit report information content in the pre- 
versus post-ISA 700 era, I use readability to evaluate how well the ISA 700 report 
communicates its message to the user.  In addition, I use audit report tone to assess what 
the auditor is communicating in the expanded report.  I also examine domain-specific 
word lists in the context of auditor disclosure to investigate word choice differences in 
auditor disclosure versus management disclosure.  Overall, my test results show the 
benefit of using content measures in the evaluation of the auditor communication.   
 The next section of the paper provides an overview of ISA 700, reviews prior 
literature, and develops my hypotheses.  Section 3 discusses research methodology.  
Section 4 discusses results.  Section 5 includes supplemental analyses.  Section 6 
summarizes and concludes.  
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II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The Auditor’s Report on the Financial Statements (ISA 700) 
 The UK Financial Reporting Council issued ISA 700 (UK and Ireland), The 
Auditor’s Report on the Financial Statements in June 2013.  This standard requires audit 
report disclosures that describe: 1) the risks of material misstatement that required the 
greatest audit effort; 2) the application of materiality in the execution of the audit; and 3) 
the scope of the audit including how the engagement team addressed (1) and (2).    The 
standard is applicable for entities subject to UK Corporate Governance Code and is 
effective for fiscal periods beginning on or after October 1, 2012 (FRC 2013a).3 The 
introduction of ISA 700 (UK and Ireland) in June 2013 was the first major content 
change for the audit report in several decades.  In the press release announcing the 
issuance of the standard, Nick Land, Chairman of the FRC’s Audit and Assurance 
Council, commented, “The provision of a fuller description of the work the auditor has 
undertaken will give far more insight to investors than the binary pass/fail model of the 
current audit report (FRC 2013b).”    
 The introduction of ISA 700 provides a unique opportunity for auditors to 
discuss audit risk areas and audit scoping determinations. The standard addresses the 
critiques of the historical pass/fail model audit report by requiring client-specific audit 
risk information in the report.  The standard provides suggestions for items to disclose 
                                                 
3 Entities subject to UK Corporate Governance Code reporting are companies with a Premium listing of equity shares 
on the London Stock Exchange and companies incorporated in Ireland with a primary or secondary equity listing on 
the Ireland Stock Exchange.   The London Stock Exchange designates Premium listing for companies and investment 
entities that issue equity securities and comply with the UK super-equivalent governance requirements. 
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such as the materiality type (overall, performance, and threshold for audit committee 
communication), audit coverage by area, locations visited by the auditor, and the audit 
group structure (centralized or multi-location).  The standard also states the FRC’s 
preference for client-specific language instead of “standardized language” when 
applying the provisions of ISA 700 (FRC 2013a).  
Audit Report Readability  
Communication Value, Communication Theory, and the Audit Report  
 The audit report in its simplest form is a communication from the auditor to 
financial statement users about the results of the audit. Figure 1 shows the audit report 
communication model based on the linear communication model advanced by Shannon 
and Weaver (Shannon and Weaver 1949).   Academic research on the communication 
value of the audit report has noted both an expectations gap and an information gap 
when assessing the communication value of the audit report.  The expectations gap is the 
gap between what the auditor’s responsibility is and what financial statement users 
believe the auditor’s responsibility should be.  The information gap is a different, but 
related concern, wherein there is a gap between information that is publicly available to 
the financial statement user and information that is not publicly available, that the 
financial statement user believes will be helpful in investment decision-making (IAASB 
2011).    An abundance of research on the expectations gap has resulted in mixed results 
on whether the changes to the audit report introduced by standard-setters have reduced 
the expectations gap (Mock et al. 2013; Church et al. 2008; Gray et al. 2011; Coram et 
al. 2011; Turner et al. 2010; Geiger 1994; Miller et al. 1990; Miller et al. 1993).   
 10 
 
Research on the information gap is limited, but survey evidence shows that financial 
statement users prefer more information in the audit report to assist with understanding 
their underlying investments (IAASB 2011; IOSCO 2009; CFA Institute 2010). 
 Smith and Smith (1971) advance the importance of communication theory when 
assessing how well financial reporting delivers its message to the financial statement 
users.  In their study, they introduce readability as an approach to evaluate the 
effectiveness of financial reporting communication.  Using a sample of fifty financial 
statements notes, they find that the notes are understandable to readers with at least a 
college education, highlighting the complexity of the documents.  They contend that 
readability is an adequate measure to evaluate the performance of how well financial 
reporting communicates its message about the client (Smith and Smith 1971).  Other 
studies show similar findings that financial statement communication is very complex 
when evaluating management reports (Lewis et al. 1986), footnote disclosure (Barnett 
and Loeffler 1979), corporate annual reports (Soper and Dolphin 1964; Jones and 
Shoemaker 1994; Clatworthy and Jones 2001; Courtis 1998; Courtis 1995; Li 2008) and 
analyst reports (De Franco et al. 2015).  
 Calculating readability is an approach to evaluate the performance of how well 
an audit report communicates its message about the audit process and the audited entity.  
There are limited studies that evaluate the readability of audit reports.  Barnett and 
Loeffler (1979) find that the audit report readability is “very difficult.” In addition, they 
found no statistically significant difference in readability between the external auditors 
issuing the audit report.     Pound (1981) finds for a sample of Australian audit reports 
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that the reading ease is “inhibitive” to effectively communicating audit results to 
financial statement users. Consistent with Barnett and Loeffler (1979), Pound did not 
find a difference in reading ease among the large public accounting firms.  Taken 
together, these studies show that the audit report is inherently difficult to understand and 
that there is an opportunity to improve the communication value of the audit report.   
ISA 700, Communication Value, and Readability   
 Leading to the issuance of ISA 700 (UK and Ireland), standard-setters discussed 
readability (FRC 2007; ICAEW 2007).  However, most of the discussion centered on 
moving standardized audit scope language later in the report or to a separate website 
(FRC 2007). As noted in Smith and Smith (1971), “communication occurs in financial 
reporting only if the meanings intended by the information source are assigned to the 
financial statement messages by the destination.”  As previously established, readability 
is a measure that can assess how well information is communicated (Smith and Smith 
1971; Courtis 1998; Courtis 1995; Li 2008; Beattie 2014).  Therefore, it is an empirical 
question whether ISA 700, with its additional disclosure requirements, improves the 
readability of the audit report.   Readability could improve as the auditor has the 
flexibility to comply with the provisions of ISA 700.  If the auditor views the expanded 
audit report as a communication to the financial statement user and not a compliance 
exercise, the auditor may be more inclined to communicate in a way that is easier for the 
recipient to understand.  As such, the readability of the audit report may improve with 
the implementation of ISA 700.   
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In informal discussions with UK audit practitioners from several international 
accounting firms, I noted a consistent theme of making the additional disclosures 
beneficial to the reader.  Specifically, one senior practitioner commented that there was a 
focus to “make the [audit report] as readable as possible.”  Another practitioner 
commented that their firm “tried to stay away from jargon terms, [wanted to make the 
report] easy to follow.”  If the auditor acts with a communication focus versus a 
compliance focus when implementing ISA 700, the auditor will create an audit report 
that is more readable than the pre-ISA 700 audit report.  As such, I state my first 
hypothesis in the alternative: 
 H1a:    Audit report readability improves in the post-ISA 700 
   audit report period compared to the pre-ISA 700 audit 
   report period. 
 
Audit Report Tone 
 Critics of the expanded audit report raised concerns regarding the potential for 
boilerplate disclosures that provided limited information to the user (IAASB 2011; Mock 
et al. 2013; Gray et al. 2011; Citi Research 2014a).  Readability measures how well a 
financial reporting message conveys its intended audience but it does not fully capture 
what the message contains.  Recent accounting and finance literature has introduced 
content analysis to provide insights on whether the content of business texts is related to 
investor behavior (Antweiler and Frank 2004; Tetlock 2007; Tetlock et al. 2008; 
Loughran and McDonald 2011).  One commonly used content analysis measure is tone, 
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wherein tone captures the “affect” or “feeling” (Henry 2008) of Form 10-Ks, business 
press articles, and investor informal chat discussions4.   
  Prior to the issuance of ISA 700, the need for an evaluation of audit report tone 
was non-existent as all audit reports contained the same boilerplate language.  With ISA 
700, there is an opportunity to examine the feeling communicated based on the words 
used as reflected in tone measures.  I use Loughran & McDonald’s (2011) Negative, 
Positive, and Uncertainty word dictionaries to capture the audit report tone.  These three 
word dictionaries are more appropriate in the audit report setting as the negative and 
uncertainty word dictionaries approximate the level of negative or risk-related content 
discussed in the audit report.  The positive word dictionary used in this setting captures 
the alternative word choice to negative or uncertain language. ISA 700 requires auditors 
to disclose risks of material misstatements that the engagement team dedicated 
significant effort to and to disclose the material and scoping decisions related to those 
risk assessments.   In informal discussion with audit partners on the implementation of 
ISA 700, they remarked that firms did not overly rely on standard audit report templates 
and allowed audit partners to tailor the audit report based on the underlying client-risks.    
One interviewee stated that the firm stressed that “this [audit report] is your 
communication; you need to be proud of what you have done.”  As auditors have the 
                                                 
4 Tone is commonly determined based on the word count frequency of words in psychology-developed word lists, 
such as the Harvard General Inquirer word list, found in the business texts (Loughran and McDonald 2011; Henry and 
Leone 2016).  Loughran & McDonald (2011) provide an alternative to the psychology-based categorizations by 
creating six word dictionaries specific to financial statement disclosure (negative, positive, uncertainty, litigation, 
strong, and weak). I do not use the litigation word dictionary due to the significant overlap with the negative word 
dictionary.  In addition, I do not use the strong and weak dictionaries due to low rates of occurrence.  Several studies 
in accounting and finance have used these dictionaries when examining short-selling (Engelberg et al. 2012), local 
news and firm value (Gurun and Butler 2012), and disclosure tone and shareholder litigation (Rogers et al. 2011). 
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ability to expand their word usage in the post-ISA 700 environment, I expect the 
expanded audit report to include more word variety that captures risks than in the prior 
standard audit report.  This leads me to my next hypothesis:   
 H1b:    The frequency of negative, positive, and uncertain words 
   (i.e., audit report tone) will be higher in the post-ISA 700 
   period than in the pre-ISA 700 period.   
 
ISA 700 Audit Report and Analyst Behavior 
Financial Analysts and the Audit Report  
 The aforementioned audit report communication model illustrates three 
components in the communication process: 1) the auditor, 2) the audit report, and 3) the 
financial statement user.   To assess the communication value of the expanded audit 
report, it is necessary to determine if the financial statement user receives the audit 
report message.  Financial statement users include a broad constituency including 
investors, financial analysts, banks, and regulators.   Of these users, financial analysts 
are sophisticated consumers of financial information.   The financial analyst performs an 
“information intermediary” role in the capital market by reducing the information 
asymmetry between management and the investor (Healy and Palepu 2001).  
 The audit report is a source of information for financial analysts when 
performing their information intermediary role.  Prior research shows that analysts value 
the unqualified opinion included in the audit report (Coram et al. 2011; Mock et al. 
2009).  In an experiment with Australian financial analysts, Coram et al. (2011) show 
that analysts focus on the opinion but not on the remaining audit report content. Mock et 
al. (2009) conducted focus groups with users, including financial analysts, to obtain user 
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perceptions on the standard audit report.  Their results show that financial analysts desire 
“more information and transparency” in the audit report (Mock et al. 2009).  An analyst 
participating in the focus group commented that “in addition to the company’s disclosure 
of how they selected specific estimates and their judgments, analysts also would like a 
similar discussion from the auditor (Mock et al. 2009).”  The CFA Institute, a 
professional association of investment professionals, issued a 2010 survey in which 94% 
of the respondents liked to see more information in the standard audit report (CFA 
Institute 2010). In addition, survey research on sell-side and buy-side analysts show that 
financial reports are an input to the forecasting process (Brown et al. 2015; Brown et al. 
2014).   In summary, prior research illustrates the analysts’ use of the audit report and 
preference for additional information in the audit report.  Following prior studies, I 
examine two analyst behaviors, analyst following and analyst forecast dispersion, to 
capture changes in analyst effort and changes in the information environment in the post-
ISA 700 period.  
ISA 700 Audit Report and Analyst Following 
 Bloomfield (2002) shows that complex financial information is harder to process 
by investors because of the high information processing costs expended to identify 
relevant information (Bloomfield 2002). Following this theory, Lehavy et al. (2011) 
suggest that for less readable documents, analysts can provide a service to the investor 
by following the company and extracting the relevant information thereby reducing the 
investors’ information processing costs. Therefore, following the logic in their findings, 
less readable audit report communication and lower frequency of tone words in audit 
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report provide more opportunity for analysts to provide intermediary services in 
processing complex information.  This in turn results in higher analyst following.   
Alternatively, if the information processing costs for opaque (i.e., less readable) 
communication are too high, the analyst may choose not to provide their services 
resulting in a decrease in analyst following (Lehavy et al. 2011).   
 Although prior literature shows that less readable disclosures are associated with 
greater analyst following when examining annual report readability, it is unclear how 
analyst following will change in the expanded audit report setting.  The expanded audit 
reports may be more readable and contain tone words that better represent audit risk, but 
may not change the information processing costs as the reports may convey what the 
analyst already knows about client risks.  This would result in no change in analyst 
following in the post-ISA period.  Alternatively, the expanded audit report may provide 
additional information to the investors in a manner that alters the need for an information 
intermediary.  As such, analyst following may change in the post-ISA 700 period.  Due 
to these competing predictions, I state my next hypothesis in the null: 
  H2a:   Analyst following does not change in the post-ISA 700 period.   
ISA 700 Audit Report and Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
 Analyst forecast dispersion captures the variation in the views of analysts in their 
forecasts for a company.  Analysts use private information along with publicly disclosed 
financial information to inform their earnings forecast.  With each financial analyst 
having differing information sets and differing abilities to forecast, variation in the 
earnings forecasts occurs.   Prior literature shows the less readable communication 
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contributes to higher analyst forecast dispersion due to the high cost of processing and 
interpretation (Lehavy et al. 2011).  ISA 700 audit reports include client-specific audit 
disclosures available to all financial analysts for use in forecasting earnings.  The 
availability of these disclosures in terms of more readability and higher frequency of 
words representing audit risk (i.e. tone) could reduce the cost of processing the 
information, but the effect on the interpretation could differ.  On one hand, audit reports 
in the post-ISA 700 period could result in analysts interpreting the client-risks in a 
consistent manner due to the ease of information processing.  This results in more 
consistency with other analyst forecasts leading to reduced forecast dispersion.  On the 
other hand, audit reports in the post-ISA 700 period could result in analysts generating 
divergent views due to the revelation of new information or due to differences in 
interpretations of the new disclosures.  This leads to the same or increased forecast 
dispersion in the post-ISA 700 period compared to the pre-ISA 700 period.   Due to 
these competing predictions, I state my next hypothesis in the null: 
  H2b:   Analyst forecast dispersion does not change in the post-ISA 700 
   period.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Content Measures  
Readability Measure 
Consistent with readability studies (Li 2008; De Franco et al. 2015; Smith and Smith 
1971), I use FOG as the primary readability measure to compare the pre-ISA 700 audit 
reports to the post-ISA 700 audit reports.5  The Fog Index (FOG) is a widely used 
readability statistic developed by Robert Gunning (Gunning 1952)  that evaluates the 
number of words in a sentence and the percentage of complex words (words with three 
syllables or more) to estimate the number of formal years of education an average person 
would need to read and comprehend the text.6   The higher the measure the more 
complex the text.   
 FOG = (words per sentence + percent of complex words) x 0.4.  (1) 
 To calculate FOG for each company-year observation, I obtain all annual reports 
for the companies, extract the audit report, and convert all documents to text files.  I 
remove all header and pagination information from the text file to result in text-only 
                                                 
5 Flesch-Kincaid (KINCAID) and Flesch (FLESCH) Reading Ease are additional readability measures.  The Flesch-
Kincaid (KINCAID) Index calculates readability based on syllables per word and words per sentence and rates the text 
based on the U.S. grade school level.  The higher the measure the more education is required to read the text.  It is 
calculated as: (11.8 x syllables per word) + (0.39 x words per sentence) – 15.59.    Flesch (FLESCH) Reading Ease 
rates reading ease on a scale of 1 to 100 based on words per sentence and syllables per sentence.  Contrary to FOG and 
KINCAID, the higher the number, the easier the text is to read.   FLESCH is calculated as:  206.8 – (1.015 x words per 
sentence) – (84.6 x syllables per word).  The empirical results and inferences using these measures are consistent with 
the FOG measures and are untabulated. 
6 I do not perform tests using other measures of readability such as file size (Loughran and McDonald 2014) and BOG  
(Bonsall et al. 2015) as these measures are focused on compliance with US Securities and Exchange Commission rules 
on Plain English usage and are not fully applicable in the UK reporting setting. 
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opinion.  Using Perl (Lingua::EN::Fathom package), I calculate FOG for each firm-year 
observation.7     
Tone Measures 
 Tone is commonly determined based on a “bag of words” approach using the 
frequency of words in psychology-developed word lists, such as the Harvard General 
Inquirer word list, appearing in business texts (Loughran and McDonald 2011; Henry 
and Leone 2016). The word frequencies are utilized to quantify the tone exhibited in the 
written texts.   Loughran & McDonald (2011) provide an alternative to the psychology-
based lists by creating six word dictionaries specific to financial statement disclosure 
(negative, positive, uncertainty, litigation, strong, and weak).   
 I obtain the Negative, Positive, Uncertainty word lists from Bill McDonald’s 
Word List Page maintained at http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html.  The 
latest Master Word List (Dictionary) is as of March 2015.   There are 2,355 words 
included in the Negative word list, 354 words included in the Positive word list, and 297 
words included in the Uncertainty word list.  I converted the word lists to column 
vectors that include word and dummy variables that correspond to the designated word 
list for each word.  Due to the overlap in the Negative and Uncertain word lists, several 
words included more than one dummy variable.  After the column vectors were 
completed, I imported the matrix into the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
                                                 
7 In other readability studies (Li 2008; De Franco et al. 2015), length is used to capture another facet of readability and 
is calculated as the logarithmic transformation of the number of words in the text. In my setting, the audit report length 
mechanically increases due to the additional disclosures required by ISA 700. As such, length is not a readability 
measure in this study. 
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Software as a custom dictionary.  Using the custom dictionary function, LIWC analyzed 
each audit report in the sample to generate the NEGATIVE, POSITIVE, and 
UNCERTAIN tone measures.  The measures represent the word count frequency for the 
negative, positive, and uncertain word lists that appear in the sample audit reports. 
ISA 700 Implementation and Audit Report Readability (H1a) 
 Prior readability models used by Li (2008) focus on client-specific variables 
when evaluating MD&A disclosure developed by client management.   Audit reports are 
a product of both client characteristics and auditor characteristics.  I expand the Li 
(2008) model to include auditor characteristics (Hronsky 1998) that may impact the level 
of auditor disclosure in the audit opinion. In addition, I control for the audit report 
structure.  The following model tests the association between ISA 700 implementation 
and audit report readability.  I use a differences approach where each firm serves as its 
own control using one observation from the pre-ISA 700 period and one observation 
from the post-ISA 700 period.    
FOG  = 0 +1 NEWOPINIONit + 2 SIZEit + 3 MBit  
  + 4 AGEit +5 SIit + 6 EARN_VOLit + 7 NBSEGit 
  + 8 ACQUISITIONit  + 9 SEOit + 10 BIGNit    
  + 11 COMBINED_OPit    +  Industry Effects + (2) 
 
NEWOPINION, the variable of interest, is an indicator variable equal to one if the audit 
opinion is issued in the first year of ISA 700 implementation and zero otherwise (the 
year immediately prior to ISA 700 implementation).  I control for client characteristics 
and auditor characteristics that may alter the level of auditor disclosure in the auditor’s 
opinion.  Larger firms (SIZE), high market-to-book firms (MB), firms with special items 
(SI), firms with earnings volatility (EARN_VOL), firms with multiple business segments 
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(NBSEG), firms that are acquisitive (ACQUISITION), firms that issue equity offerings 
(SEO), and firms with a combined audit opinion (COMBINED_OP) are more likely to 
have complicated audit opinions.  Older firms (AGE) and Big N firms (BIGN) are less 
likely to have complicated audit opinions.   Industry fixed effects are included to control 
for industry variation.    Variable descriptions are included in Appendix A.   
ISA 700 Implementation and Audit Report Tone (H1b) 
To test the association between the implementation of ISA 700 and the tone of 
the audit report, I modify the readability model in Equation 2 to include tone measures 
(NEGATIVE, POSITIVE, and UNCERTAIN) as the dependent variables.  I also include a 
composite tone measure, COMBINED_TONE, to capture the overall change in word 
usage by summing NEGATIVE, POSITIVE, and UNCERTAIN for each observation.  I 
include the same control variables in the tone model as in the readability model as the 
same client and auditor specific characteristics that drive the complexity of an audit 
report also drive the tone of the audit report.  The following model tests the association 
between ISA 700 implementation and audit report tone.   
TONE  = 0 +1 NEWOPINIONit + 2 SIZEit + 3 MBit  
  + 4 AGEit +5 SIit + 6 EARN_VOLit + 7 NBSEGit 
  + 8 ACQUISITIONit  + 9 SEOit + 10 BIGNit    
  + 11 COMBINED_OPit    +  Industry Effects + (3) 

NEWOPINION, the variable of interest, is an indicator variable equal to one if the audit 
opinion is issued in the first year of ISA 700 implementation and zero otherwise (the 
year immediately prior to ISA 700 implementation).  Consistent with Equation 2, I 
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include industry fixed effects to control for industry variation.    All other variable 
descriptions are consistent with Equation 2 and are included in Appendix A.     
ISA 700 and Analyst Following (H2a) 
 To test the association between ISA 700 implementation and analyst following, I 
follow prior literature (Bhushan 1989; Marston 1997; Lehavy et al. 2011). Equation 4 
tests the association between ISA 700 implementation and analyst following.  Equation 5 
tests the association between audit report readability (tone) and analyst following.  
Equation 6 tests the interactive effect of ISA 700 implementation and audit report 
readability (tone) on analyst following.   
FOLLOWING  = 0 +1 NEWOPINIONit + 2 LOGSIZEit + 3 MBit  
   + 4 NBSEGit +5 INSTit + 6 RDit + 7 EARN_VOLit 
   + 8 CROSS_LISTit + 9 logFILESIZEit + Industry Effects  
   + (4) 
 
FOLLOWING  = 0 +1 FOG (TONE)it + 2 LOGSIZEit + 3 MBit  
   + 4 NBSEGit +5 INSTit + 6 RDit + 7 EARN_VOLit 
   + 8 CROSS_LISTit  + 9 logFILESIZEit +  Industry Effects  
   + (5) 
 
FOLLOWING  = 0 +1 NEWOPINIONit + 2 FOG (TONE)it  
   + 3 NEWOP*FOG (NEWOP*TONE)it + 4 LOGSIZEit  
   + 5 MBit + 6 NBSEGit +7 INSTit + 8 RDit + 9 EARN_VOLit  
   + 10 CROSS_LISTit  + 11 logFILESIZEit +  Industry Effects  
   + (6) 
 
Consistent with prior literature (Lehavy et al. 2011; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995), FOLLOWING is calculated as the number of 
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analysts included in the first consensus forecast estimate after audit report issuance.8   
NEWOPINION is the variable of interest in Equation 4 and FOG (TONE) is the variable 
of interest in Equation 5.    The interaction term, NEWOP*FOG (NEWOP*TONE), is the 
variable of interest in Equation 6.  I control for client characteristics that are associated 
with analyst following found in prior literature.  Lehavy et al. (2011), Bhushan (1989), 
O’Brien and Bhushan (1990), and Marston (1997) find that larger firms (LOGSIZE) have 
greater analyst following.  As a proxy for growth (Lehavy et al. 2011), I use the 
logarithm of book to market firms (MB).  To control for firm complexity (Lehavy et al. 
2011; Marston 1997) that may lead to higher analyst following, I include the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s business segments (NBSEG).  Institutional ownership is 
associated with high analyst following, therefore I control for institutional ownership 
(INST) (Bhushan 1989; Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995; Frankel et al. 2006).  I also 
control for high research and development expense (RD) (Barth et al. 2001), volatile 
earnings (EARN_VOL) (Lehavy et al. 2011), and UK firms cross-listed in the US 
(CROSS_LIST) (Marston 1997).    Finally, I control for the content of the audit report 
using the logarithmic transformation of the electronic file size of the audit report 
                                                 
8 The United Kingdom Listing Authority Disclosure and Transparency (DTR) Rule 6.4 requires all issuers to issue 
audited annual reports within four months of the fiscal period end.  The audited annual report includes the audit report.  
Per DTR 6.3, the issuer must provide a public announcement of the availability of the audited annual report using a 
regulatory information service (i.e., London Stock Exchange Regulatory News Service (RNS)) and file the 
announcement with the National Storage Mechanism (NSM).  I hand-collect the annual report announcement dates 
from NSM for each firm-year in my sample.  For the limited number of observations where the announcement date 
was not clearly determined, I obtained the audit report release date from Bloomberg.  DTR 6.3 is located here:   
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DTR/6/3.html .  NMS is located here:  
http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/NSM . 
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(logFILESIZE).  Industry fixed effects are included to control for industry variation.    
Variable descriptions are included in Appendix A.    
ISA 700 and Analyst Forecast Dispersion (H2b) 
 To test the association between the implementation of ISA 700 and analyst 
forecast dispersion, I follow Lehavy et al. (2011).  Equation 7 tests the association 
between the implementation of ISA 700 and analyst forecast dispersion.  Equation 8 
tests the association between analyst forecast dispersion and audit report readability 
(tone) and the ISA 700 period.  Equation 9 tests the interactive effect of ISA 700 
implementation and audit report readability (tone) on analyst forecast dispersion.   
 
DISPERSION   = 0 +1 NEWOPINIONit + 2 LOGSIZEit + 3 MBit  
   + 4 NBSEGit +5 INSTit + 6 RDit + 7 EARN_VOLit 
   + 8 logFILESIZEit  + Industry Effects + (7) 
 
DISPERSION   = 0 +1 FOG (TONE)it + 2 LOGSIZEit + 3 MBit  
   + 4 NBSEGit +5 INSTit + 6 RDit + 7 EARN_VOLit 
   + 8 logFILESIZEit  +  Industry Effects + (8) 
 
DISPERSION  = 0 +1 NEWOPINIONit + 2 FOG (TONE)it  
   + 3 NEWOP*FOG (NEWOP*TONE)it  
   + 4 LOGSIZEit + 5 MBit + 6 NBSEGit +7 INSTit  
   + 8 RDit  + 9 EARN_VOLit + 10 logFILESIZEit   
   +  Industry Effects + (9) 
 
Consistent with Lehavy et al. (2011), DISPERSION is defined as the standard deviation 
of the individual analyst earnings per share forecasts in the first analyst consensus 
forecast (annual) after audit report issuance, scaled by the share price 90 days prior to 
the consensus forecast date.  NEWOPINION is the variable of interest in Equation 7 and 
FOG (TONE) is the variable of interest in Equation 8.  NEWOP*FOG (NEWOP*TONE) 
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is the variable of interest in Equation 9.  Consistent with Equations 4-6, I control for 
client characteristics are associated with analyst forecasts.  Industry fixed effects are 
included to control for industry variation.  Variable descriptions are included in 
Appendix A.    
Sample Selection 
 The study sample is comprised of companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) that are required to comply with the 
provisions of ISA 700.  I start with all companies listed in the Compustat Global 
Fundamentals Annual Dataset listed on the London Stock Exchange or Irish Stock 
Exchange from 2012 – 2014.  From those firms, I eliminate firm-year observations prior 
to the year immediately before ISA 700 implementation and firms that are not Premium 
listed based on the December 31, 2013 LSE Company Listing.9  In addition, I eliminate 
financial institutions and investment funds based on the London Stock Exchange 
Securities Groups.  I obtain financial information and securities identifying information 
from the Compustat Global Fundamental Annual and Security Daily Datasets.  This 
results in 458 companies eligible for the readability analysis.   
 I obtain audit reports for the pre-ISA 700 and post-ISA 700 periods for each 
company identified to generate readability statistics.  I eliminate 30 companies in which 
readability statistics are not determinable due to language translation or file security 
issues.   Subsequently, I match the Compustat Global and readability data to the Bureau 
                                                 
9 The listing of LSE companies and securities are located at 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/companies-and-issuers/companies-and-issuers.htm . 
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van Dijk Amadeus (Financials) Dataset to obtain closing share price, market 
capitalization, and shares outstanding for each firm-year observation.  I obtain 
institutional ownership information from Bloomberg and analyst information from the 
I/B/E/S International Summary Statistics File.   Audit firm information is hand collected 
from company annual reports for each company in the sample.  The resulting sample 
size is 350 companies and 700 company-year observations.  Table 1 presents the sample 
size calculation for this study. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results  
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the study sample.  By design, fifty 
percent of the sample audit reports are subject to the provisions of ISA 700 
(NEWOPINION).  The mean FOG value of 27.35 indicates that the audit report remains 
a complicated text when compared to other business texts such as Form 10-Ks 
(FOG=19.39) and Wall Street Journal articles (FOG=15.20) (Li 2008).    The tone 
measures for the sample show that 1.24% (NEGATIVE) of the words in the audit report 
are included in the negative word lists.  Only 0.25% (POSITIVE) of the words in the 
audit reports are included in the positive word lists and 0.87% (UNCERTAIN) of the 
words in the audit reports are included in the uncertainty word lists.  The NEGATIVE 
tone measure is consistent with Loughran and McDonald’s negative tone of 1.39% when 
assessing Form 10-Ks (Loughran and McDonald 2011).  However, the measures for 
POSITIVE and UNCERTAIN are lower for my audit report sample than for Form 10-K 
samples noted in the finance literature.  The mean analyst following (FOLLOWING) is 
approximately 11 analysts and the mean forecast dispersion (DISPERSION) is 0.30.   
 Audit firm related descriptive statistics show that the four largest international 
accounting firms (BIGN) audit 93% of the sample.  Seventy-five percent (BUSY) of the 
audits occur during the months of December – March.  Sixty-nine percent 
(COMBINED_OP) of the audit reports include the report for both the group and the 
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parent company.10  The natural logarithm of audit fees for the sample is 13.00 
(LOGFEES).  These audit firms descriptive statistics show that the companies subject to 
ISA 700 are primarily clients of the Big N firms and the audit work is concentrated in 
the traditional audit year-end work periods.11  London audit firm offices issue fifty-five 
percent (LONDON) of the sample audit opinions.  Client specific descriptive statistics 
show that 19% (FTSE 100) and 39% (FTSE250) of the company-year observations are 
for companies listed on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) Index 100 and 250 
for the entire sample period, respectively.  The average size of the companies in the 
sample is 20.49 (SIZE) and the average age of the company is approximately 24 years.  
The market-to-book ratio is 2.41 (MB) and only 16% (LOSS) are loss firms.  Two 
percent (GOING CONCERN) of the sample audit opinions have going concern report 
modifications.   Approximately one-third (EXP_DOMINANCE) of the sample are 
audited by firms that are industry leaders.  Overall, the client statistics show that the 
sample is comprised of mature companies that are fiscally healthy.  All continuous 
variables have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to account for outliers in 
the sample.   
 Table 3 includes the results of the univariate analysis that compares test variables 
in the pre-ISA 700 period to the post-ISA 700 period.   The results show that readability 
                                                 
10 In the United Kingdom, the corporate structure includes the group and the parent company.  In most cases, the 
operations of the company are recorded in the group accounts with the holding company operations in the parent 
company.    
11 I evaluate readability measures on an audit firm basis.   In untabulated results, BDO and KPMG have the lowest 
average FOG measures at 26.22 and 26.56, respectively.  PWC, which has the highest number of observations in our 
sample, has an average FOG of 27.55.  OTHER, which represents the smallest firms in our sample, have an average 
FOG of 28.10. Overall, this provides support that there is variation in audit report content across firms.      
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(FOG) showed statistically significant improvement in the Post-ISA 700 period. FOG 
decreased 4.83 points (p<0.01).  This result provides initial support that the expanded 
audit report improved in readability, which then enhances the usefulness of the report to 
the financial statement reader.   Similarly, all tone measures increased in the Post-ISA 
700 period with NEGATIVE showing the highest increase with an increase of 0.87.   
Untabulated results show that the majority of the client characteristics variables did not 
have a statistically significant change in the post-ISA 700 period from the pre-ISA 700 
period.  MB increased slightly and more firms had acquisition activity (ACQUISITION).  
In addition, more firms combined the parent company audit report with the group audit 
report in the post-ISA 700 period.  Related to the audit report, the number of pages 
increased in the Post-ISA 700 period to 3.34 pages from 1.23 pages in the pre-ISA 700 
period.  On average, auditors included approximately four risks in the ISA 700 audit 
report.  The analyst behavior variables, FOLLOWING and DISPERSION, showed 
decreases in the post-ISA 700 period, but the differences are not statistically significant. 
The multivariate analyses that follow further explore these univariate results. 
Multivariate Results 
Hypothesis 1a 
 Hypothesis 1a evaluates the association between readability and the 
implementation of ISA 700.  Table 4 presents the ordinary least squares regression 
results of estimating Equation 2.  The variable of interest, NEWOPINION, is negative 
and significant (p<0.01).  The coefficient of (-4.99) shows that an average person would 
need five fewer years of formal education to read and comprehend the audit report in the 
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post-ISA 700 period.   This indicates that in the post-ISA 700 report period audit report 
complexity decreased resulting in a more readable report.  Said differently, the 
improvement in readability shows that the overall communication value has improved in 
the expanded audit report.  The coefficients on the firm-specific control variables are not 
statistically different from zero except the positive coefficients on BIGN (p<0.10) and 
COMBINED_OP (p<0.01).  This indicates that a change in client-level factors did not 
have an effect on how the auditors disclosed audit risks, materiality, and audit scope 
decisions.  The change in readability is consistent with UK practitioners’ views that the 
new standard was the impetus for generating reports that were easy to understand.   
These results support H1a and show strong evidence that audit reports under ISA 700 are 
more readable to users thereby achieving the intended purpose of ISA 700 of improving 
communication value of the report.   
Hypothesis 1b 
 Hypothesis 1b tests the association between the implementation of ISA 700 and 
audit report tone. Table 5 presents the result of the ordinary least squares regression of 
Equation 3.   Column 1 shows that the variable of interest, NEWOPINION, is positive 
and significant (p<0.01) when NEGATIVE is the dependent variable.  This indicates that 
the tone of the post-ISA 700 report is more negative than in the prior period.  This is 
consistent with auditors including risks of material misstatements and the impact of the 
risks on the scope of the audit.   Large firms (BIGN) generated reports that had higher 
negative language evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient (p<0.01).    
Interestingly, clients with special items (SI), segments (NBSEG), and combined opinions 
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(COMBINED_OP) have less negative language in their audit opinions.  These areas 
would potentially generate additional disclosures but may have written in a manner that 
fewer negative terms were included.    
 Column 2 includes the results when POSITIVE is the dependent variable.  Again, 
the variable of interest is positive and significant (p<0.01), however the magnitude of the 
coefficient NEWOPINION is much smaller than the coefficients when NEGATIVE and 
UNCERTAIN are the dependent variables.  Larger clients (SIZE) have a statistically 
significant association with positive language in the audit report.  Large firms (BIGN) 
have a higher occurrence of positive language in their audit report.  Firms with volatile 
earnings (EARN_VOL) had fewer occurrences of positive language in their audit reports.  
The results from Column 2 indicate that in the post-ISA 700 period, auditors included 
positive language in the expanded audit report but at a lower frequency.   
 Column 3 provides results when UNCERTAIN is the dependent variable.  
Consistent with both Columns 1 and 2, the variable of interest, NEWOPINION, is 
positive and significant (p<0.01) when evaluating the presence of uncertain language. 
Large firms (SIZE) have a higher occurrence of uncertain language (p<0.01) while SI, 
EARN_VOL, and COMBINED_OP remain negative and significant (p<0.01).  
Evaluating the composite tone measure, COMBINED_TONE, the coefficient on 
NEWOPINION is positive and significant (p<0.01) indicating that in the post-ISA 700 
period there is a higher rate of occurrence for tone-related words. Overall, the results 
provide evidence the audit report tone did increase in the post-ISA 700 period supporting 
H1b.  The results refute the argument that the additional disclosures in ISA 700 would 
 32 
 
be boilerplate in nature and highlight the benefit of the auditor language choice in 
disclosure.   
Hypothesis 2a  
 Hypothesis 2a tests the association between analyst following and the 
implementation of ISA 700.  Table 6 presents the ordinary least squares regressions of 
Equations 4-6.  Column 1 shows that the coefficient on NEWOPINION is negative and 
significant (-0.65, p<0.01).  This indicates that the change in the information 
environment may have resulted in analysts reallocating their efforts away in following 
specific companies.  This is consistent with the view that less complicated documents 
require fewer services of an information intermediary to reduce the information-
processing costs for investors.  However, the average number of analysts following is 
fewer by less than one analyst.  The reduction is equivalent to 5.9% given the average 
analysts following of 11.   
 Consistent with prior literature, Column 2 shows that the coefficient on FOG is 
positive and significant (p<0.01).  Similar to the findings when evaluating annual report 
readability (Lehavy et al. 2011), less readable audit reports are associated with higher 
analyst following.  The coefficients on LOGSIZE, INST, and EARN_VOL are positive 
and significant (p<0.01) in both Columns 1 and 2 providing evidence that firm size, 
institutional ownership and earnings volatility contribute to a higher analyst following.12 
                                                 
12 In untabulated tests, I conduct the same analysis for Equations 4 and 5 using the number of analyst following 
immediately prior to the earnings announcement to capture any variation in forecast timing.  In these tests, 
NEWOPINION is negative and significant (p<0.01) and FOG is positive and significant (p<0.01).  These results and 
inferences are consistent with the findings in Table 6. 
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When evaluating the interactive effect of audit report readability in the post-ISA 700 
period in Column 3, the main effect of NEWOPINION remains negative and significant 
at the p<0.10 level.  The main effect of FOG remains positive and significant at the 
p<0.10 level; however, the interaction, NEWOP*FOG, is not statistically significant.13   
 Column 4 reports a negative but insignificant coefficient (p>0.10) on 
COMBINED_TONE.   Column 5 reports positive but insignificant coefficients (p>0.10) 
on NEWOP*TONE and COMBINED_TONE.  Taken together, these results show that in 
the post-ISA 700 period the content measures are not associated with analyst following.   
Hypothesis 2b 
 Hypothesis 2b tests the association between analyst forecast dispersion and the 
implementation of ISA 700.  Table 7 presents the results of the ordinary least squares 
regressions of Equations 7-9.   Column 1 reports a negative and marginally significant 
coefficient on NEWOPINION (p<0.10), supporting H2b.  These results indicate that the 
introduction of client-specific audit disclosures in the ISA 700 report assisted in 
reducing the variation between analysts when developing their forecasts.  The public 
dissemination of audit risks and audit scoping decisions provides all analysts with 
similar information to use in their forecasts.  The availability of previously private 
information has a leveling effect on the analyst forecasts resulting in reduced dispersion.     
 In Column 2, the coefficient on FOG is positive and significant (p<0.05). This 
indicates that less readable audit reports contribute to higher analyst dispersion.  A less 
                                                 
13 To address collinearity in the interaction models, FOG (TONE) is mean-centered when the interaction term is 
included in Equation 6.  
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readable audit report is subject to more interpretation by the analyst covering the client 
and results in wider forecast dispersion.  Consistent with prior literature, the number of 
segments, institutional ownership, and research and development expenditures are 
positive and significant (p<0.10).    Overall, the results show that analyst behavior 
responded to the ISA 700 required disclosures. This validates the analysts’ position that 
a more informative audit report is beneficial to their role as financial statement users.  In 
the interaction model, NEWOP*FOG is negative and significant (p<0.10) indicating that 
FOG is less associated with analyst dispersion in the post-ISA 700 period.14   
 In Columns 4 and 5, the coefficients on COMBINED_TONE are negative but 
insignificant (p>0.10).   The coefficient on NEWOP*TONE in Column 5 is positive and 
insignificant.  These results indicate that the variation effect of tone is diminished in the 
post-ISA 700 period.     
  
                                                 
14 To address collinearity in the interaction models, FOG (TONE) is mean-centered when the interaction term is 
included in Equation 6. 
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V. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
ISA 700 Audit Report Readability and Audit Quality 
 In November 2006, the FRC issued a discussion paper entitled “Promoting Audit 
Quality” that introduced an audit quality framework that included four main drivers of 
audit quality, which included the “reliability and usefulness of audit reporting (FRC 
2006).”    Linking communication theory to the FRC audit quality framework, more 
readable audit reports are more useful reports, which contributes to higher audit quality.   
This logic is consistent with practitioner feedback on the implementation of ISA 700, 
that the expanded audit report is a “positive driver of audit quality.”   
 Thus, auditor characteristics such as auditor size and office size that are 
associated with higher audit quality, may contribute to differential readability in audit 
reports.  The auditing literature has shown that Big N firms exhibit higher audit quality 
than non-Big N firms due to their size and access to resources (Defond et al. 2014; Choi 
et al. 2010; DeAngelo 1981; Dopuch and Simunic 1982). Studies using office size show 
that larger offices perform higher quality audits than smaller offices when evaluating 
earnings quality (Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 2010) and restatements (Francis et al. 
2013) because larger offices possess a higher level of independence from their clients 
and expertise.  As such, it is possible that the audit quality benefits embedded in large 
auditors and large practice offices shown in the financial reporting setting will extend to 
the audit report readability setting.   
Auditor expertise is another auditor characteristic that may lead to differences in 
ISA 700 audit report readability.  Prior literature shows that national-level and city-level 
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industry experts provide higher quality audits (Reichelt and Wang 2010) and that there is 
an audit fee premium for industry experts (Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005).  
Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang (2003) also find that clients of audit industry specialists 
have better earnings quality than clients of non-audit industry specialists (Balsam et al. 
2003).  If the auditor is an industry expert, they may be well versed in the industry and 
can communicate their understanding of the client’s business in an easy to read manner.  
Alternatively, the industry expert may resort to using industry jargon and terminology 
when discussing significant audit matters that may limit the readability of the audit 
report even when providing higher quality audits.   
 While ISA 700 is applicable for any auditors of premium listed companies on the 
London Stock Exchange or a listed company on the Ireland Stock Exchange (FRC 
2013a), auditors are not equally equipped to apply this new standard.  Barclays’ Audit 
Committee Member Mike Ashley, stated that “the big four accountancies have fared 
well but [said] the next tier of firms had been slower to react (Pearce 2014).” This 
comment provides additional motivation for understanding implementation differences 
between Big N firms and non-Big N firms, between large and small practice offices, and 
between industry experts and non-experts.   
The following model tests the association between auditor characteristics and audit 
report readability in the post-ISA 700 period.   
FOG    =  0 + 1 (Auditor Characteristics) +  2 SIZEit + 3 MBit  + 4 AGEit  
  +5 SIit  + 6 EARN_VOLit  + 7 NBSEGit  + 8 ACQUISITIONit   
  + 9 SEOit  + 10 COMBINED_OPit   +  Industry Effects +(10) 

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I evaluate three auditor characteristics, Big N firm affiliation, industry expertise, and 
office size and their association with audit report readability.  BIGN is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the auditor is one of the big four international accounting firms.  
Industry expertise is captured using two measures based on the number of clients audited 
by the firm in a specific SIC Code (one-digit).  EXP_NUMCLT is equal to one if the 
company is audited by an audit firm with the most clients in that industry when 
compared to all other audit firms in the sample in year t and zero otherwise.  
EXP_DOMINANCE is equal to one if the company is audited by an audit firm that has 
10% more audit clients in an industry than the firm’s nearest competitor in year t and 
zero otherwise.   OFFICE_SIZE equals the number of audit clients in each firm office 
for each firm-year in the sample.  Industry fixed effects are included to control for 
industry variation.    All other variable definitions are consistent with Equation 2. 
 Table 8 reports the ordinary least regression of Equation 10.  This test uses 
observations in the post-ISA 700 period only because auditors have much less flexibility 
in audit reporting in the pre-ISA 700 period.  Column 1 shows that readability improves 
when a Big N firm issues the audit report. The coefficient is negative and significant 
(p<0.05).  This finding is consistent with untabulated univariate tests comparing 
readability statistics by firm.15  Column 2 shows the coefficient on OFFICE_SIZE (p < 
0.05) is negative and significant providing evidence that larger offices generate reports 
that are more readable.     
                                                 
15 The Big N firms had the largest average FOG change with a decrease of 4.96 points compared to the Non-Big N 
firms that had an average FOG change of 1.67 points. 
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Columns 3 and 4 include the results when evaluating industry expertise and the 
association with readability.  Consistent with the results in Columns 1 and 2, the 
coefficient on EXP_NUMCLT and EXP_DOMINANCE are both negative and significant 
at the 1% level. Based on the results in Column 4, the effect is slightly stronger for the 
dominant industry leader.  Columns 5 and 6 show the results of the full model including 
the Big N, office size, and industry expertise variables.  When measuring industry 
expertise by the number of clients, Column 5 shows that BIGN and EXP_NUMCLT are 
significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.  In Column 6, when industry expertise 
is measured by industry dominance, the coefficient on EXP_DOMINANCE is negative 
and significant (p< 0.01) with BIGN maintaining marginal significance (p<0.10).  Taken 
together, the results from Columns 5 and 6 show that industry expertise is more strongly 
associated with improved readability.  The results from Table 8 show that higher 
readability is associated with higher audit quality characteristics providing support that a 
more readable, hence a more usable report, contributes to audit quality.16  
ISA 700 Audit Report Readability and Audit Firms 
 Recent analyst and regulatory reports on the implementation of ISA 700 have 
noted variation in the “quality of risk discussion” (Citi Research 2014a; Citi Research 
2014b; FRC 2015; FRC 2016) among the auditors of FTSE 100 companies.  ISA 700 
                                                 
16 For brevity, I do not report the results of auditor characteristics and report tone. The inferences are similar. In sum, I 
find that high quality auditor characteristics are associated with changes in tone in the ISA 700 period.  BIGN firms 
are associated with more negative words (p<0.10) in the ISA 700 audit reports, but industry experts (EXP_CLIENT or 
EXP_DOMINANCE) use fewer negative words (p<0.01).  BIGN firms and industry experts are not associated with 
positive word use in the ISA 700 audit reports.  Similar to the negative word finding, industry experts use fewer 
uncertain words (p<0.01).   
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reports generated by Ernst & Young (EY) are characterized as having less risk 
disclosures than the other Big 4 international accounting firms (Citi Research 2014b).  
To evaluate whether there is also variation in the readability of audit reports, I perform a 
firm analysis on readability in the year of implementation. I modify Equation 2 to 
include an indicator variable, EY, that equals one if the auditor is EY and zero otherwise 
resulting in Equation 11.  I add an interaction variable NEWOP*EY to Equation 11 
resulting in Equation 12.   
FOG  = 0 +1 EYit + 2 SIZEit + 3 MBit  
  + 4 AGEit +5 SIit + 6 EARN_VOLit + 7 NBSEGit 
  + 8 ACQUISITIONit  + 9 SEOit   
  + 10 COMBINED_OPit    +  Industry Effects + (11) 
 
FOG  = 0 +1 NEWOPINIONit + 2 EYit  + 3 NEWOP*EYit   
  + 4 SIZEit + 5 MBit  + 6 AGEit +7 SIit + 8 EARN_VOLit  
  + 9 NBSEGit + 10 ACQUISITIONit  + 11 SEOit + 
  + 12 COMBINED_OPit    +  Industry Effects + (12) 
 
 Table 9 reports the results of the ordinary least squares regression of Equations 
11 and 12.  Column 1 reports the coefficient on EY of 1.062 is positive and significant 
indicating that an average person would need one additional year of formal education to 
read and comprehend audit reports generated by EY.  In Column 2, the interaction 
coefficient on NEWOP*EY of 3.86 is significant at the 1% level indicating that 
approximately four more levels of education are necessary to read the audit reports 
generated by EY in the post-ISA 700 period compared to other firms.  This shows that 
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opportunity remains for audit firms to provide more readable and informative audit 
reports in future implementation periods.17   
Alternative Tone Measures Analysis 
With the advent of the expanded audit report in the UK, the words describing the 
audit reflect the linguistic choice of auditors.  Prior accounting literature has evaluated 
the linguistic choice of managers when analyzing the tone of Form 10-Ks, conference 
calls, and press releases (Li 2010; Matsumoto et al. 2011; Henry 2008; Henry 2006).  
Henry and Leone (2016) evaluate tone measures used in the capital markets literature to 
provide evidence on the differences in general and domain-specific word lists when 
analyzing financial texts.   In addition, the authors compare the dictionary approach to 
more complicated content analyses such as natural language processing and inverse 
document frequency (idf) weighting (Henry and Leone 2016).  I extend their evaluation 
of tone measures into the audit report setting using the introduction of the ISA 700 report 
to: 1) further examine audit report tone; 2) assess differences in word dictionaries used 
in content analysis; and 3) determine if tone measures created in the management 
disclosure setting are also relevant in the new auditor disclosure setting.    
In the test of Hypothesis 1a, I utilize the Loughran and McDonald (LM) (2011) 
negative, positive, and uncertain word dictionaries.  To evaluate whether alternative tone 
measures also show increased word choice and negative tone as shown in the Table 4 
                                                 
17 In untabulated analyses, I also evaluate each of the remaining Big N firms using the same model construction as 
Equations 11 and 12.  The interaction coefficient on PWC*NEWOP of -2.67 is significant at the 1% level.  The 
interaction coefficient on KPMG*NEWOP was also negative (-0.34) but not significant.  DT*NEWOP was positive 
(0.22) but not significant.  These results show the variation in ISA 700 implementation across the international firms 
and indicate areas for additional improvement. 
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results, I construct three additional tone measures following the variable construction in 
Henry and Leone (2016).18     
TONE_LM   = (POSITIVE-NEGATIVE)/(POSITIVE + NEGATIVE)           (12) 
Where POSITIVE and NEGATIVE refer to the word count 
frequency based on the positive and negative words in the 
Loughran and McDonald word lists, respectively.   
 
TONE_FD Henry = (POSITIVE-NEGATIVE)/(POSITIVE + NEGATIVE)           (13) 
Where POSITIVE and NEGATIVE refer to the word count 
frequency based on the positive and negative words in the FD 
Henry word lists, respectively.   
 
TONE_LIWC  = (POSITIVE-NEGATIVE)/(POSITIVE + NEGATIVE)           (14) 
Where POSITIVE and NEGATIVE refer to the word count 
frequency based on the positive emotion and negative emotion 
words in the LIWC word list, respectively.  
  
 The LM and FD Henry word lists are domain-specific based on financial texts 
such as Form 10-Ks and earnings press releases.   The LIWC word list is a general list 
created to evaluate a wide variety of written and spoken texts.  Following the tone 
interpretation in Henry and Leone (2016), an audit report with a maximum positive tone 
results in a tone score of one (1).  An audit report with a maximum negative tone results 
in a tone score of negative one (-1).   An audit report with a neutral tone results in a tone 
score of zero (0).    
                                                 
18 As noted in Section III, the LM word lists include 2,355 negative words and 354 positive words.  The FD Henry 
word lists are derived from Henry (2006, 2008) include 93 negative words and 117 positive words (Henry 2006; 
Henry 2008). The LIWC word lists, created by Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzales, and Booth (2007) as a part of 
the LIWC text analysis software, provide an efficient method of analyzing the structural, emotional, and cognitive 
components of written language (Pennebaker et al. 2007).   The LIWC word lists include 499 negative words and 408 
positive words.   
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I modify the dependent variable, TONE, in Equation 3 to represent the alternative 
tone measures, TONE_LM, TONE_FD Henry, and TONE_LIWC.  I expect that, 
consistent with the findings in Table 4, the post-ISA 700 audit report will have a more 
negative tone reflected in a negative coefficient on NEWOPINION. Additionally, I 
expect a higher usage of domain-specific words in the post-ISA 700 reports.      
Table 10 reports the univariate and multivariate results evaluating the alternative 
tone measures.  Panel A shows the univariate analysis of the tone measures and the audit 
report word frequency for each word list (LM, FD Henry, or LIWC).  All tone measures 
show a statistically significant decrease in tone when comparing the post-ISA 700 
reports to the pre-ISA 700 reports.  The tone measures based on domain-specific word 
lists (LM and FD Henry) are both negative in the post-ISA 700 period.  However, the 
tone measure based on the general word list (LIWC) had a positive tone in both periods, 
but was less positive in the post-ISA 700 period.   When examining the coverage of audit 
report words by the each of the three word lists, an interesting trend emerges.   The 
domain-specific word lists, LM and FD Henry, only capture 3.8% and 1.5% of the post-
ISA 700 audit report words, respectively.  On the other hand, the LIWC word lists 
captures 79% of the audit report words in both the pre- and post-ISA 700 periods.  This 
difference in word capture between domain-specific and general word lists provides 
some evidence that audit reports may include more common language than disclosures 
generated by management.  This evidence is consistent with both anecdotal and 
regulatory views on the expanded audit report that indicate a less complicated discussion 
of audit matters in the report.   
 43 
 
Panel B of Table 10 reports the ordinary least squares regression of Equations 
11-13.  Column 1 reports a negative and significant (p<0.01) coefficient on 
NEWOPINION when TONE_LM is the dependent variable.  Columns 2 and 3 report 
similar results when TONE_FD Henry and TONE_LIWC are the dependent variables.   
These results further support the univariate analysis and the Table 4 results that the post-
ISA 700 reports had a negative tone indicating the reports captured the underlying risks 
of the audit.   Although the test results are consistent, the explanatory power of each 
model varies.  The R2 for Column 1 is 37.25% compared to 69.92% in Column 2 and 
81.12% in Column 3.  These differences in explanatory power shows the importance of 
word list selection when evaluating different types of financial texts.   Appendix C 
summarizes the most frequent domain-specific words included in the pre- and post-ISA 
700 audit reports.  
ISA 700 Implementation and Market Response 
 Contemporaneous studies (Gutierrez et al. 2016; Reid et al. 2015; Lennox et al. 
2015) evaluate the market reaction to the introduction of ISA 700 reporting.  Although 
my study focuses on the auditor’s response to ISA 700, I also examine market response 
using abnormal trading volume (AVOL) and abnormal returns (ABRET).19  In 
untabulated analysis, I find a negative and insignificant (-0.03, p=0.54) association 
between NEWOPINION and AVOL.  I also find a positive but insignificant association 
                                                 
19 AVOL is calculated as the mean daily trading volume during the event period (-1, 0, 1) minus the mean daily trading 
volume during the non-filing period (-61, -21) deflated by the standard deviation of daily trading volume during the 
non-filing period (-61,-21).   The estimation period is based on the earnings announcement date to avoid capturing 
trading volume related to the release of earnings.  ABRET is calculated as company returns minus London Stock 
Exchange value weighted returns for the event period (-1, 0, 1).   
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(0.01, p=0.31) between FOG and AVOL. Further, in assessing abnormal returns, I find a 
positive and insignificant association between NEWOPINION and ABRET (0.00, 
p=0.63).  Consistent with the AVOL tests, I finds a negative and insignificant association 
between FOG and ABRET (-0.00, p=0.27).  Taken together, this provides evidence that 
the market did not have an observable response to the introduction of the expanded audit 
report.  
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The introduction of ISA 700 presented a significant shift in auditor disclosure 
included in the audit report.  The FRC designed the additional disclosures on risks of 
material misstatement and audit scoping decisions to make the standard audit report 
more informative to the audit report user.  I examine whether introduction of ISA 700 
changes the communication value of the audit report.  Using readability and tone to 
measure communication value allows for a direct evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
expanded audit report.  In addition, I address the financial statement users’ response to 
the expanded audit report by evaluating analyst following and analyst forecast 
dispersion.  Finally, I investigate the association of the expanded audit report with audit 
firm characteristics associated with high quality audits.  
I find that audit reports in the post-ISA 700 period are more readable indicating 
improved communication value.  I show that ISA 700 adoption resulted in more negative 
and uncertain audit report tone.  This indicates that auditors capture the underlying risks 
of their clients by utilizing negative and uncertain words in the expanded audit report.   
The audit report tone results also provide indirect evidence that the auditor disclosures 
were not boilerplate but varied in language choice.   In evaluating the financial statement 
users’ response, I find that both analyst following and analyst forecast dispersion 
decreased lending support that the expanded audit report effected financial statement 
user behaviors.   
My study contributes to the audit literature in three ways. First, my paper is the 
first to provide a content analysis of the expanded audit report to gain insight into how 
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and what auditors communicate using the expanded audit report and adds significantly to 
readability and tone literatures.  Second, my findings are useful to standard-setters and 
regulators.  ISA 700 reports are easier to read and provide more information to assist 
investors and information intermediaries in making informed investment decisions.  In 
addition, the ISA 700 reports are not boilerplate in nature and adequately capture the 
underlying client-specific audit risks through negative and uncertain word usage.  I also 
contribute to the literature by showing that high-quality auditor characteristics are 
associated with producing more readable audit reports.  Finally, I provide initial 
evidence in word choice differences in auditor disclosure compared to management 
disclosure.   This study should be of interest to standard-setters, regulators, and 
academics as the study provides a content-based approach to evaluating the 
implementation of expanded auditor disclosure that can inform future standard setting.     
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Dependent Variables – Main Analyses 
FOG Calculated as words per sentence + percent of complex words) x 0.4. 
NEGATIVE Represents the word count frequency in the audit report based on the 
Loughran and McDonald Negative Word List. 
POSITIVE Represents the word count frequency in the audit report based on the 
Loughran and McDonald Positive Word List. 
UNCERTAIN Represents the word count frequency in the audit report based on the 
Loughran and McDonald Uncertain Word List. 
COMBINED_TONE Calculated as the sum of NEGATIVE, POSITIVE, and UNCERTAIN.   
FOLLOWING Calculated as the number of analysts included in the first consensus forecast 
estimate after audit report issuance. 
DISPERSION Calculated  as the standard deviation of the individual analyst forecasts in 
the first analyst consensus forecast (annual) after audit report issuance, 
scaled by the share price 90 days prior to the consensus forecast date. 
Dependent Variables – Supplemental  Analyses 
TONE_LM Calculated as (POSITIVE-NEGATIVE)/(POSITIVE + NEGATIVE), where 
POSITIVE and NEGATIVE refer to the word count frequency based on the 
positive and negative words in the Loughran and McDonald word lists, 
respectively.   
TONE_FD Henry Calculated as (POSITIVE-NEGATIVE)/(POSITIVE + NEGATIVE), where 
POSITIVE and NEGATIVE refer to the word count frequency based on the 
positive and negative words in the Loughran and McDonald word lists, 
respectively.   
TONE_LIWC Calculated as (POSITIVE-NEGATIVE)/(POSITIVE + NEGATIVE), where 
POSITIVE and NEGATIVE refer to the word count frequency based on the 
positive and negative words in the LIWC word lists, respectively.   
Test Variables 
NEWOPINION Is an indicator variable equal to one if the audit opinion is issued in the first 
year of ISA 700 implementation and zero otherwise (the year immediately 
prior to ISA 700 implementation).   
FOG Calculated as words per sentence + percent of complex words) x 0.4. 
BIGN Is an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor is one of the big four 
international accounting firms in year t and zero otherwise.   
EXP_NUMCLT  Is equal to one, if the company is audited by an audit firm with the most 
clients in that industry when compared to all other audit firms in the sample, 
in year t and zero otherwise.   
EXP_DOMINANCE Is equal to one if the company is audited by an audit firm that has 10% more 
audit clients in an industry than the firm’s nearest competitor in year t and 
zero otherwise.    
OFFICE_SIZE Equals the number of audit clients in each firm office for each firm-year in 
the sample. 
EY Is equal to one, if the company is audited by EY in year t and zero 
otherwise.  
Control Variables 
ACQUISITION Is an indicator variable equal to one if the company’s acquisition expense is 
greater than zero in year t and zero otherwise.   
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AGE Represents the number of years since the company’s IPO at the end of year 
t. 
BIGN Is an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor is one of the big four 
international accounting firms in year t and zero otherwise.   
BUSY Is an indicator variable equal to one if the company’s fiscal year end is from 
December to March and zero otherwise.    
COMBINED_OP Is an indicator variable equal to one if the audit report includes both the 
group audit report and the parent company audit report in year t and zero 
otherwise. 
CROSS_LIST Is an indicator variable equal to one if the company is listed on a US stock 
exchange and zero otherwise.   
EARN_VOL Represents the standard deviation of earnings over the prior five year period 
at the end of year t.  
Industry Fixed Effects Fama and French 12 Industry Classification 
INST Decile ranking of the number of the company’s shares held by institutional 
investors divided by the number of the company’s shares outstanding at the 
end of the fiscal year.   
LOGSIZE Represents the logarithmic transformation of market value at the end of year 
prior to the issuance of the audited financial report.  
logFILESIZE Represents the logarithmic transformation of the file size of the audit report.   
LOSS Is an indicator variable equal to one if the firms has net income of less than 
zero and zero otherwise.    
MB Represents the market value at the end of year t divided by the book value at 
the end of year t.   
NBSEG Represents the logarithmic transformation of the number of business 
segments included in the Bureau van Dijk dataset.   
RD Represents the ratio of research and development expenses to total operating 
expenses for the fiscal year. 
SEO Is an indicator variable equal to one if the company is listed in the Thomson 
One Equity Issuance Database as issuing an equity offering in year t and 
zero otherwise.   
SI Represent the amount of special items scaled by total assets at the end of 
year t.   
SIZE Represents the logarithmic transformation of total assets at the end of year t.   
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APPENDIX B 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
Figure 1 
Audit Report Communication Model 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Size Calculation 
 
 
Companies 
Observations 
t and t-1 
Sample Criteria   
Companies in Compustat Global listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) or Irish Stock Exchange with fiscal year ends from 2012 – 2014 
1,680 3,360 
Less: Company fiscal year ends prior to the year immediately 
before ISA 700 implementation 
(101) (202) 
Less: Non LSE Premium Companies  (871) (1,742) 
Less:  Banks and Financial Institutions  (250) (500) 
 458 916 
Less:  Observations without readability data (30) (60) 
Less: Companies without available stock data (78) (156) 
Full Sample 350 700 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
NEWOPINION 700 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
FOG 700 27.35 27.24 3.16 24.30 29.90 
FOLLOWING 620 10.70 9.00 6.79 4.00 16.00 
DISPERSION 566 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.07 0.47 
LOGFEES 700 13.00 12.90 1.05 12.21 13.71 
RAW_FEES (millions) 700 0.77 0.40 0.85 0.20 0.90 
BIGN 700 0.93 1.00 0.26 1.00 1.00 
OP_PAGES 700 2.29 2.00 1.31 1.00 3.00 
OP_RISKS 700 2.00 1.00 2.22 0.00 4.00 
FTSE100 700 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 
FTSE250 700 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 700 20.49 20.50 1.50 19.26 21.80 
SI 700 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 
LOSS 700 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 
BUSY 700 0.75 1.00 0.43 1.00 1.00 
MB 700 2.41 1.84 1.78 1.03 3.43 
ACQUISITION 700 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
AGE 700 23.91 18.00 17.09 10.00 37.50 
NBSEG 700 3.98 4.03 1.17 3.09 4.77 
SEO 700 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 
EARN_VOL 700 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.06 
COMBINED_OP 700 0.69 1.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
EXP_NUMCLT 700 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
EXP_DOMINANCE 700 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
LOGSIZE 700 6.45 6.61 1.58 5.16 7.72 
INST 698 5.49 5.50 2.87 3.00 8.00 
RD 700 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 
CROSS_LIST 700 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 
NEGATIVE 700 1.24 1.21 0.58 0.97 1.70 
POSITIVE 700 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.16 0.30 
UNCERTAIN 700 0.87 0.80 0.44 0.44 1.29 
LONDON 700 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
GOING_CONCERN 700 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 
Note:  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles
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TABLE 3 
Univariate Statistics  
(Mean Values) 
  
  Pre-ISA 700 
(NEWOPINION=0) 
 Post-ISA 700 
(NEWOPINION=1) 
Mean 
Difference 
 N  N   
FOG 350 29.76 350 24.93 -4.83*** 
NEGATIVE 350 0.80 350 1.67 0.87*** 
POSITIVE 350 0.23 350 0.27 0.04*** 
UNCERTAIN 350 0.49 350 1.26 0.77*** 
FOLLOWING 310 10.84 310 10.57 -0.27 
DISPERSION 283 0.31 283 0.28 -0.03 
LOGFEES 350 12.99 350 13.01 0.02 
RAW_FEES (millions) 350 0.76 350 0.78 0.02 
BIGN 350 0.93 350 0.93 0.00 
OP_PAGES 350 1.23 350 3.34 2.11*** 
OP_RISKS 350 0.03 350 3.97 3.94*** 
COMBINED_OP 350 0.61 350 0.77 0.16*** 
 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
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TABLE 4 
ISA 700 Auditor Reporting Requirement and Audit Report Readability 
This table examines the association between the ISA 700 auditor reporting requirement and audit report 
readability.  Variable definitions are located in Appendix A. T-values are in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.10; represents one-tailed p-value significance for signed predictions and two-tailed p-
value significance for unsigned predictions.  Industry effects are included.  Standard errors clustered by 
firm. 
  
 (1) 
 DV=FOG 
NEWOPINION -4.99 
 (-30.55)*** 
SIZE -0.08 
 (-1.01) 
MB -0.03 
 (-0.58) 
AGE -0.00 
 (-1.05) 
SI -0.63 
 (-0.14) 
EARN_VOL -2.89 
 (-1.57) 
NBSEG 0.01 
 (0.14) 
ACQUISITION 0.03 
 (0.19) 
SEO -0.22 
 (-1.02) 
BIGN 0.76 
 (1.81)* 
COMBINED_OP 1.08 
 (6.40)*** 
  
  
Constant 29.79 
 (19.70)*** 
  
  
Industry FE? Yes 
R2 62.58% 
N 700 
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TABLE 5 
ISA 700 Auditor Reporting Requirement and Audit Report Tone Analysis 
This table examines the association between the ISA 700 auditor reporting requirement and audit report 
tone. Variable definitions are located in Appendix A. T-values are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.10; represents one-tailed p-value significance for signed predictions and two-tailed p-value 
significance for unsigned predictions.   Industry effects are included.  Standard errors clustered by firm. 
     
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 
DV= 
NEGATIVE 
DV= 
POSITIVE 
DV= 
UNCERTAIN 
DV= 
COMBINED 
TONE 
NEWOPINION 0.92 0.04 0.78 1.77 
 (36.50)*** (7.12)*** (51.68)*** (46.16)*** 
SIZE -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 
 (-0.02) (2.10)** (3.47)*** (1.93)* 
MB -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.39) (1.08) (-0.49) (-0.31) 
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.25) (1.02) (1.66)* (1.56) 
SI -2.34 0.19 -1.36 -3.14 
 (-3.06)*** (1.07) (-2.70)*** (-2.73)*** 
EARN_VOL 0.24 -0.19 -0.37 -0.29 
 (0.70) (-2.18)** (-2.01)** (-0.63) 
NBSEG -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 
 (-2.16)** (-1.55) (-0.96) (-2.23)** 
ACQUISITION 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (-0.16) (1.17) (0.37) 
SEO -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.21) (-0.46) (0.46) (-0.11) 
BIGN 0.21 0.04 0.05 0.31 
 (2.89)*** (3.40)*** (1.35) (3.16)*** 
COMBINED_OP -0.32 -0.04 -0.07 -0.44 
 (-11.46)*** (-6.52)*** (-4.17)*** (-10.85)*** 
     
     
Constant 0.86 0.09 -0.12 0.78 
 (2.95)*** (1.32) (-0.72) (1.97)** 
     
Industry FE?              Yes             Yes             Yes          Yes 
R2           67.79% 15.38% 80.13% 77.65% 
N              700             700             700          700 
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TABLE 6 
ISA 700, Audit Report Readability, and Analyst Following 
This table examines the association between: 1) ISA 700 and analyst following; and 2) audit report 
readability and analyst following. Variable definitions are located in Appendix A. T-values are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; represents one-tailed p-value significance for signed 
predictions and two-tailed p-value significance for unsigned predictions.   Industry effects are included.  
Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)           (5) 
 DV=FOLLOWING 
NEW 
OPINION -0.65  -0.57  -1.44 
    (-3.96)***  (-1.68)*  (-2.86)*** 
FOG  0.11 0.10   
    (3.31)***  (1.65)*   
NEWOP 
*FOG 
  
-0.18   
   (-1.62)   
COMBINED
_TONE 
   
-0.15 0.38 
    (-1.38) (1.07) 
NEWOP 
*TONE 
  
  0.16 
     (0.34) 
      
LOGSIZE 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.95 2.94 
  (18.55)***  (18.77)***  (18.73)*** (18.53)*** (18.43)*** 
MB 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 
 (1.88)*  (1.87)* (1.89)* (1.78)* (1.91)* 
NBSEG 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.28) (0.22) 
INST 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 
    (2.96)***    (2.93)***   (2.87)*** (2.98)*** (2.89)*** 
RD 10.92 10.59 11.01 10.96 11.15 
 (1.32) (1.28) (1.33) (1.33) (1.33) 
EARN_VOL 25.43 25.70 25.92 25.59 25.44 
    (5.47)***    (5.55)***    (5.65)*** (5.53)*** (5.47)*** 
CROSS LIST 1.26 1.37 1.32 1.23 1.29 
 (1.37) (1.50) (1.44) (1.33) (1.40) 
logFILESIZE -0.38 -0.40 -0.40 -0.43 -0.39 
   (-2.06)**   (-2.17)**   (-2.16)** (-2.30)** (2.11)** 
      
Constant -10.536 -13.88 -10.72 -10.28 -10.03 
     (-8.00)***    (-7.70)***     (-8.01)*** (-7.87)*** (-7.24)*** 
      
Industry FE?       Yes       Yes         Yes       Yes      Yes 
R2 76.09% 76.15% 76.25% 75.92% 76.21% 
N       620       620         620       620      620 
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TABLE 7 
ISA 700, Audit Report Readability, and Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
This table examines the association between: 1) ISA 700 and analyst forecast dispersion; and 2) audit 
report readability and analyst forecast dispersion. Variable definitions are located in Appendix A. T-
values are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; represents one-tailed p-value significance for 
signed predictions and two-tailed p-value significance for unsigned predictions.   Industry effects are 
included.  Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 DV=DISPERSION 
      
NEW 
OPINION -0.02  0.00  -0.03 
 (-1.66)*  (0.16)  (-0.78) 
FOG  0.01 0.01   
  (2.28)** (2.26)**   
NEWOP 
*FOG   -0.02   
   (-1.87)*   
COMBINED
_TONE    -0.01 -0.00 
    (-1.18) (-0.20) 
NEWOP 
*TONE     0.02 
     (0.47) 
      
LOGSIZE -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-1.60) (-1.57) (-1.55) (-1.60) (-1.59) 
MB -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.96) (-0.93) 
NBSEG 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (1.67)* (1.70)* (1.76)* (1.69)* (1.65)* 
INST 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (1.82)* (1.81)* (1.69)* (1.83) (1.80) 
RD 1.45 1.43 1.44 1.44 1.44 
 (2.12)** (2.10)** (2.13)** (2.11)** (2.10)** 
EARN_VOL -0.25 -0.23 -0.20 -0.25 -0.25 
 (-0.86) (-0.80) (-0.69) (-0.84) (-0.85) 
logFILESIZE 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.12) (-0.06) (0.07) (0.13) 
      
Constant 0.35 0.18 0.32 0.36 0.35 
 (2.95)*** (1.26) (2.78)*** (3.14)*** (2.78)*** 
      
Industry FE?         Yes       Yes       Yes Yes Yes 
R2 12.70% 12.99% 13.50% 12.63% 12.73% 
N        566       566       566 566 566 
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TABLE 8 
Audit Report Readability and Auditor Characteristics 
This table examines the association between the ISA 700 auditor reporting requirement and auditor 
characteristics. Variable definitions are located in Appendix A. T-values are in the parentheses.  *** 
p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; represents one-tailed p-value significance for signed predictions and two-
tailed p-value significance for unsigned predictions.  Industry effects are included.  Standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DV=FOG 
  BIGN -1.23    -0.96 -0.89 
 (-2.54)**    (-1.94)* (-1.75)* 
  
OFFICE_SIZE  -0.01   -0.01 -0.01 
  (-2.10)**   (-1.34) (-1.36) 
  EXP_ 
NUMCLT   -0.61  -0.47  
   (-3.17)***  (-2.42)**  
  EXP_ 
DOMINANCE    -0.89  -0.77 
    (-4.55)***  (-3.83)*** 
  SIZE -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.09 -0.09 
 (-0.87) (-1.23) (-1.49) (-1.41) (-0.81) (-0.78) 
  MB -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 
 (-0.19) (-0.54) (-0.35) (-0.31) (-0.04) (0.00) 
  AGE -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.98) (-0.82) (-1.04) (-1.24) (-1.02) (-1.21) 
  SI 2.60 3.15 5.30 5.86 3.76 4.47 
 (0.44) (0.54) (0.89) (0.99) (0.64) (0.76) 
  EARN_VOL 2.45 3.60 3.80 3.78 3.13 3.21 
 (1.06) (1.61) (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.35) (1.39) 
  NBSEG 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 
 (0.48) (0.35) (0.30) (0.28) (0.59) (0.56) 
 ACQUISITION 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 
 (0.31) (0.42) (0.34) (0.37) (0.46) (0.49) 
  SEO -0.25 -0.24 -0.39 -0.44 -0.33 -0.390 
 (-0.96) (-0.94) (-1.40) (-1.60) (-1.20) (-1.44) 
  COMBINED 
_OP 0.23 0.29 0.27 0.22 0.28 0.23 
 (0.82) (1.06) (1.02) (0.83) (1.06) (0.91) 
       
       
  Constant 27.66 27.56 28.30 28.29 27.48 27.51 
 (12.72)*** (12.70)*** (12.74)*** (12.78)*** (12.49)*** (12.53)*** 
       
  Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  R2 6.46% 4.94% 6.40% 8.63% 8.52% 10.53% 
  N 350 350 350 350 350 350 
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TABLE 9 
ISA 700 Auditor Report Readability and Audit Firms 
This table examines the association between the ISA 700 auditor reporting readability and audit firms.  
Variable definitions are located in Appendix A. T-values are in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.10; represents one-tailed p-value significance for signed predictions and two-tailed p-value 
significance for unsigned predictions.  Industry effects are included.  Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 DV=FOG 
NEWOPINION  -5.52 
  (-37.47)*** 
EY 1.06 -0.43 
 (3.51)*** (-1.15) 
NEWOP*EY  3.86 
  (9.14)*** 
   
SIZE -0.19 -0.04 
 (-2.00)** (-0.53) 
MB -0.18 0.00 
 (-3.34)*** (0.03) 
AGE -0.01 -0.00 
 (-2.28)** (-1.01) 
SI 5.72 -0.82 
 (0.88) (-0.20) 
EARN_VOL -1.57 -3.99 
 (-0.65) (-2.15)** 
NBSEG 0.04 0.02 
 (0.43) (0.24) 
ACQUISITION 0.43 0.22 
 (1.98)** (1.41) 
SEO -0.64 -0.31 
 (-1.51) (-1.54) 
COMBINED_OP 0.27 1.47 
 (1.38) (9.37)*** 
   
Constant 31.05 29.40 
 (17.07)*** (19.88)*** 
   
   
Industry FE?             Yes            Yes 
R2 4.29% 68.13% 
N 700 700 
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TABLE 10 
Alternative Tone Measures 
This table examines the association between the ISA 700 auditor reporting readability and alternative tone measures.  
Variable definitions are located in Appendix A. T-values are in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; 
represents one-tailed p-value significance for signed predictions and two-tailed p-value significance for unsigned 
predictions.  Industry effects are included.  Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A:  Univariate Analysis  (Mean Values) 
  
Pre-ISA 700 
(NEWOPINION=0)  
Post-ISA 700 
(NEWOPINION=1) 
Mean 
Difference 
 N  N  (Post – Pre) 
LM Dictionary 350 2.504 350 3.834 1.330*** 
LIWC Dictionary 350 79.561 350 79.403 0.158 
FD Henry Dictionary 350 0.724 350 1.459 0.735*** 
TONE_LM 350 -0.437 350 -0.715 -0.278*** 
TONE_LIWC 350 0.901 350 0.372 -0.529*** 
TONE_FD Henry 350 0.122 350 -0.361 -0.483*** 
Panel B:  Multivariate Analysis  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 DV=TONE_LM DV=TONE_FD Henry DV=TONE_LIWC 
NEWOPINION -0.30 -0.48 -0.53 
 (-17.02)*** (-35.28)*** (-53.66)*** 
SIZE 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.56) (-0.00) (0.17) 
MB 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.93) (0.37) (1.57) 
AGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.12) (-1.06) (-0.64) 
SI 0.81 0.84 1.66 
 (1.44) (2.53)** (5.08)*** 
EARN_VOL -0.38 -0.26 -0.05 
 (-1.66)* (-1.73)* (-0.38) 
NBSEG 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (1.42) (0.66) (0.22) 
ACQUISITION 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.17) (-0.32) (0.60) 
SEO -0.02 0.05 -0.02 
 (-0.56) (2.07)** (-0.89) 
BIGN -0.12 0.03 0.09 
 (-2.74)*** (1.24) (2.89)*** 
COMBINED_OP 0.13 0.01 -0.01 
 (7.68)*** (0.50) (-0.58) 
    
Constant -0.56 0.10 0.84 
 (-2.86)*** (0.87) (8.04)*** 
    
Industry FE?              Yes                  Yes             Yes 
R2 37.25%  69.92% 81.12% 
N              700                  700              700 
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APPENDIX C 
TWENTY MOST FREQUENT WORDS OCCURRING IN THE PRE AND POST 
ISA 700 AUDIT REPORTS FROM THE LOUGHRAN AND MCDONALD 
NEGATIVE AND HENRY FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE WORD LISTS 
 
Panel A:  Loughran and McDonald Negative Word List 
Pre-ISA 700 Audit Reports Post-ISA 700 Audit Reports 
Rank Word % of Fin-
Neg Word 
Count 
Rank Word % of Fin-
Neg Word 
Count 
1 inconsistencies 21.56% 1 misstatement 10.96% 
2 concern 17.07% 2 concern 10.15% 
3 misstatement 11.30% 3 misstatements 
7.15% 
4 disclosed 11.17% 4 impairment 
7.14% 
5 
error 11.08% 
5 
inconsistent 6.26% 
6 
fraud 11.08% 
6 
inconsistencies 5.95% 
7 misstatements 10.85% 7 fraud 4.53% 
8 loss 2.09% 8 challenged 4.14% 
9 inconsistent 0.54% 9 disclosed 3.97% 
10 incorrect 0.45% 10 incorrect 3.79% 
11 unable 0.45% 11 misleading 3.26% 
12 doubt 0.36% 12 against 3.21% 
13 uncorrected 0.18% 13 error 2.21% 
14 critical 0.14% 14 uncorrected 1.46% 
15 redress 0.14% 15 claims 1.28% 
16 undetected 0.14% 16 loss 
1.27% 
17 concerned 0.09% 17 challenging 
1.13% 
18 
impairment 0.09% 
18 
discloses 1.07% 
19 misleading 0.09% 19 inappropriate 0.96% 
20 negligence 0.09% 20 losses 0.84% 
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Panel B:  Henry Financial Disclosure (FD) Word List 
Pre-ISA 700 Audit Reports Post-ISA 700 Audit Reports 
Rank Word % of 
Henry FD 
Word 
Count 
Rank Word % of 
Henry FD 
Word 
Count 
1 under 40.86% 1 risk 18.22% 
2 certain 26.40% 2 under 15.76% 
3 more 20.92% 3 risks 12.54% 
4 risk 7.95% 4 certain 6.83% 
5 uncertainty 0.81% 5 below 5.81% 
6 risks 0.46% 6 above 5.79% 
7 below 0.40% 7 challenged 4.98% 
8 uncertainties 0.40% 8 more 3.97% 
9 low 0.29% 9 growth 3.36% 
10 above 0.23% 10 greatest 2.29% 
11 achieve 0.23% 11 uncertain 1.79% 
12 successful 0.23% 12 least 1.56% 
13 exceeds 0.12% 13 uncertainty 1.38% 
14 greatest 0.12% 14 most 1.37% 
15 uncertain 0.12% 15 challenging 1.36% 
16 challenged 0.06% 16 lower 1.27% 
17 challenging 0.06% 17 uncertainties 0.95% 
18 exceed 0.06% 18 challenge 0.86% 
19 exceeded 0.06% 19 achieve 0.70% 
20 expansion 0.06% 20 exceed 0.57% 
 
